There will be simplifying assumptions and idealizations in the availability models of complex processes and phenomena. These simplifications and idealizations generate uncertainties which can be classified as aleatory (arising due to randomness) and/or epistemic (due to lack of knowledge). The problem of acknowledging and treating uncertainty is vital for practical usability of reliability analysis results. The distinction of uncertainties is useful for taking the reliability/risk informed decisions with confidence and also for effective management of uncertainty. In level-1 probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of nuclear power plants (NPP), the current practice is carrying out epistemic uncertainty analysis on the basis of a simple Monte-Carlo simulation by sampling the epistemic variables in the model. However, the aleatory uncertainty is neglected and point estimates of aleatory variables, viz., time to failure and time to repair are considered. Treatment of both types of uncertainties would require a two-phase Monte-Carlo simulation, outer loop samples epistemic variables and inner loop samples aleatory variables. A methodology based on two-phase Monte-Carlo simulation is presented for distinguishing both the kinds of uncertainty in the context of availability/reliability evaluation in level-1 PSA studies of NPP.
Introduction
Uncertainties are present in any reliability calculations due to randomness in the failure/repair phenomena and given the limitation in assessing the parameters of the failure/repair probability density functions. As per the IAEA report on PSA [1] , the three major categories of sources of uncertainties in reliability/availability models are (i) input parameter uncertainty: The parameters of the various models are not exactly known because of scarcity or lack of data, variability with in the populations of plants and/or components, and assumptions made by experts (ii) modelling uncertainty: These uncertainties are introduced by the relative inadequacy of the conceptual models, the mathematical models, the numerical approximations, the coding errors and the computational limits and (iii) completeness uncertainty: The lack of completeness introduces uncertainty in the results and conclusions of the analysis that is difficult to assess or quantify. However, it is possible to minimize the effect of completeness uncertainty by review of the analysis and by carrying out sensitivity studies on the model assumptions one can see the effect on the model output. The focus here is on the uncertainties regarding the numerical values of the parameters (parameter uncertainty) of a given model and distinguishing the different types of uncertainty.
Availability models (aleatory models) give mathematical expression for system availability as a function of availability of constituting components and human actions. Many methods have been developed for arriving at aleatory models such as reliability block diagram (RBD), fault tree analysis (FTA), event tree analysis, markov models, failure modes and effects analysis and stochastic simulation [1, 2] . Selection of the appropriate method depends upon the complexity of system and measures used to quantify the reliability index. The current practice of level-1 PSA of NPP recommends using FTA to model the system availability [1] . However, the use of FTA to model the availability/reliability of engineering systems limits to point estimates only and aleatory uncertainty in the random variables, viz., time to failure and time to repair are discarded. On contrary, if availability modelling is done with stochastic simulation approach then the uncertainty in availability due to random variables can be incorporated. This uncertainty is known as aleatory uncertainty which cannot be reduced or eliminated and only be quantified [3, 4] . Given the failure logic of system and probability density functions of failures/repairs, stochastic simulation can be used to incorporate the aleatory uncertainty [5, 6] .
Limitations in exactly assessing the parameters of the above-mentioned random variables are leading to uncertainty. This uncertainty is known as ''epistemic uncertainty'' which is knowledge based and can be reduced with more information [3, 4] . There are several methods available in the literature for propagating epistemic uncertainties such as: (i) analytical methods (method of moments) [7] , (ii) discrete probability distributions [8] , (iii) sampling methods [9, 10] , (iv) interval arithmetic [11] , (v) fuzzy arithmetic [10, 12, 13] , (vi) probability bounds [14] , and (vii) Dempster-Shafer Theory (evidence theory) [15] . They are different from each other, in terms of characterizing the input parameter uncertainty and also in kind of propagation from parameter level to model output level. The current practice is use of Monte-Carlo simulation to propagate epistemic uncertainties in failure rates/failure probabilities due to its several advantages [1] . The epistemic uncertainty in model parameters, i.e., failure rate/demand failure probability are characterized by a probability distribution (generally log normal distribution) and then propagated to the system level. Treatment of both types of uncertainties would require a two-phase MonteCarlo simulation, outer loop samples epistemic variables and inner loop samples aleatory variables [16] .
In environmental risk assessment problems, two-phase simulation approach was adopted in considering epistemic and aleatory uncertainties [11, [16] [17] [18] . Probability bounds approach by Ferson [14, 19] , use of evidence theory by Grandhi [20] , distribution envelope approach by Berleant [21] are available in the literature for addressing the similar problem. However, in the previous studies, model output is limited to only a function of epistemic and aleatory uncertain parameters which are separate and also applying to large scale problems is difficult as they are analytical approaches. But, in the availability modelling problem, epistemic and aleatory uncertainties are present in the same phenomena such as failure/repair. Moreover, the model output function is complex and having large number of parameters. An approach specific to unavailability modelling in level-1 PSA based on two-phase Monte-Carlo simulation which accounts for both the kinds of uncertainty and also distinguishes the same is presented in the paper.
The main emphasis of the paper is to consider both types of uncertainty in level-1 PSA. The conceptual difference and advantage of acknowledging the uncertainties are explained in Section 2. A methodology for considering epistemic and aleatory uncertainties is proposed in Section 3. This methodology is applied to quantify uncertainty in availability modelling of AC power supply system of typical Indian NPP. Section 4 gives the details of the case study and observations from the same.
Epistemic and aleatory uncertainty
The inherent variability of failures and repairs times of equipment imposes the use of probabilistic models; as such phenomena cannot be dealt with deterministic approaches. This variability is sometimes referred as 'randomness' or 'stochastic uncertainty', commonly known as 'aleatory uncertainty', which cannot be reduced [2] . However, both deterministic and probabilistic approaches are built on a number of model assumptions and model parameters that are based on what is currently known about the physics of the relevant processes and the behaviour of systems under given conditions. There is uncertainty associated with these conditions, which depends upon state of knowledge, is referred as 'epistemic uncertainty' or 'subjective uncertainty'. It is important that the uncertainties in inherent variability of physical processes (i.e., aleatory uncertainty) and the uncertainties in knowledge of these processes (i.e., epistemic uncertainty) are properly accounted for. The impact of these uncertainties must be addressed if the analysis is to serve as a tool in the decision making process. Fig. 1(a) shows the two reliability curves with the two values of the failure rate. These curves are, of course, aleatory, since they deal with the observable quantity ''time.'' The probability at time t is shown for each curve. Thus, for a given time t, the Fig. 1(a) shows clearly that there are two possible values of the reliability, each with its own probability. In this simple example, it is assumed that only two values of the failure rate are possible. In real applications, the epistemic uncertainty about l is usually expressed using a continuous probability density functions (PDF) p(l). Then, it is customary to display a family of curves for various percentiles of l. Fig. 1 (b) shows three curves with l being equal to the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles of p(l).
Need to separate epistemic and aleatory uncertainties
The first, and most important, reason for keeping epistemic and aleatory uncertainties separate is that it is mathematically more correct [22] . Mixing both the uncertainties means that one cannot see how much of the total uncertainty comes from epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. If one knows that a large part of the total uncertainty is due to epistemic uncertainty (as shown in Fig. 2(a) ) then by collecting further information and thereby reducing total uncertainty one would be able to improve the estimate of the future. On the other hand, if the total uncertainty was nearly all due to variability (as shown in Fig. 2(b) ), it is a waste of time to collect more information and the only way to reduce the total uncertainty would be to change the physical system. In general, the separation of uncertainty allows understanding what steps can be taken to reduce the total uncertainty of the model, and allows gauging the value of more information or of some potential change to the system one can make. Vose [22] explained that a much larger problem than mixing epistemic and aleatory distributions together can occur when an aleatory distribution is used as if it were epistemic distribution. Separating uncertainties very deliberately gives the discipline and understanding to avoid the much larger errors that this mistake will produce. Now, having understood how useful it is to separate uncertainties, one must see whether the effort is worth the extra information that can be gained as applicable to specific problems under consideration [27] . This is because the separation of uncertainties is time consuming and cumbersome task.
Methodology for uncertainty analysis in level-1 PSA
Level-1 PSA studies of NPP focus on evaluation of core damage frequency considering failure and maintenance characteristics of various process and safety systems in NPP. Availability is more commonly used to represent a maintainable system which is a function of reliability and maintainability. Reliability is a function of time to failure and maintainability is a function of time to repair. Hence, availability is the function of two random variables, viz., time to failure and time to repair. The fault tree approach is used presently which estimates the average unavailability based on failure rates, repair rates and demand failure probabilities (stand by failure rate) assuming all random variables (time to failure and time to repair of all components in the system) are following exponential distribution. However, randomness in unavailability is not quantified and also unavailability is approximated when there is a complex scenario, for example, stand-by tested maintenance policy. Availability modelling by stochastic simulation can quantify the aleatory uncertainty and also unnecessary assumptions can be eliminated in complex scenario. The second source of uncertainty in PSA is from parameters of PDF of failures and repairs. In case of exponential PDF, the parameter is known as failure rate/repair rate. Due to limitation in exactly assessing these parameters of the PDF, uncertainty is present in it. This type of uncertainty falls in epistemic classification as it can be reduced with more information. Having identified various uncertain parameters in the model, methodology is proposed here based on two-phase Monte-Carlo simulation to quantify and separate both kinds of uncertainty (see Fig. 3 ). repair (TTR) of all components in the model are collected. The uncertainty in the parameters of PDF (epistemic uncertainty) is also generally characterized by a probability distribution. The current practice is assigning a lognormal distribution to epistemic uncertainty with a median and error factor (for most of the components IAEA TECDOC 478 gives error factor or 5% and 95% values In certain cases test override probability has to be taken to account for its availability during testing.
As the failures occurred during standby period cannot be revealed till its testing, time from failure till identification has to be taken as down time. It is followed by imposing the standby down times obtained from the standby time to failure PDF and time to repair PDF. Apart from the availability on demand, it is also required to check whether the standby component is successfully meeting its mission. This is incorporated by obtaining the time to failure based on the operating failure PDF and is checked with the mission time, which is the down time of active component. 5. Generation of system state profile: System state profile is developed by integrating components state profiles with the system failure logic. Failure logic of complex systems is generally derived from FTA , which is logical and graphical description of various combinations of failure events. FTA represents failure logic of the system with the sum of minimal cut-sets. In other words, system logic is denoted with series configuration of parallel subsystems. Each minimal cut-set represents this subsystem which will have certain basic components in parallel. Check for the number of times first loop has to be executed, if it is less than the predetermined number of iterations then go to step 2 where sampling is done again for epistemic parameters and subsequently entering second loop. 8. After sufficient number of iterations of the outer loop, the summarized results for failure time, repair time and unavailability looks like family of curves as shown in Fig. 3 . Each cumulative probability curve of these reliability measure denotes the uncertainty due to randomness in failures and repairs, where as the spread is due to epistemic uncertainty in the parameters of PDFs.
Application in level-1 PSA studies
Uncertainty analysis for a practical system by adopting procedure mentioned in the previous section is presented here. AC power supply system is chosen as the case of application as it is very important system in the safe operation of NPP. This system is having redundant components having multi state systems with complex maintenance policies. System specific information to the extent possible is used in the availability modelling.
Description of the system [24]
Electrical power supply is essential in the operation of process as well as safety systems of any NPP. To ensure high reliability of power supply systems, high redundancy and diversity are provided in the design. Loss of off-site power supply coupled with loss of on-site AC power is called station blackout. In many PSA studies (IAEA, 1991), severe accident sequences resulting from station blackout conditions have been recognized to be significant contributors to the risk of core damage [25] . For this reason the reliability/availability modelling of AC power supply system is of special interest in PSA of NPP.
The electrical power supply system of Indian NPP consists of four classes. In the station blackout criteria, Class IV and Class III systems are only considered. Class IV power is supplied from two sources (i) grid supply and (ii) station alternator supply. Class III can be termed as redundant to Class IV supply. Whenever Class IV is unavailable, two Class III buses are fed from dedicated standby diesel generators (DGs) of 100% capacity each. The schematic diagram for the system is shown in Fig. 4 . There are three standby DGs. These DGs start automatically on failure of Class IV power supply through emergency transfer scheme. Two of the DGs supply power to the buses to which they are connected. In case of failure/unavailability of any of these two DGs, the third DG can be connected automatically to any of the two Class III buses. In case only one DG is available then tie breaker between the buses closes automatically. The class III loads are connected to the buses in such a way that failure of any one bus will not affect the performance of systems needed to ensure safety of the plant. Thus, one DG is sufficient for all the emergency loads and this gives a redundancy of one out of three.
System modelling with stochastic simulation
Failure/success logic of system can be obtained from developing RBD or qualitative FTA. The interaction between failure of components and their impact on system success state is depicted with RBD or FTA. The latter method is suitable when there is complex configuration. Time to failure and time to repair are observed to follow exponential distribution from the operating experience [26] . Exponential PDF has only one parameter, it is called failure rate if it depicts failure and repair rate if it depicts repair. Failure rate can be different for the same component if it is in standby or dormant state from the operating state. However, by changing the random variant in the simulation one can do simulation for any kind of PDF for time to failure or time to repair. Parameters of distribution for all the components in the systems are shown in the Table 1 . The exponential distribution here denotes the aleatory uncertainty in failure/repair times of various components in the system. System specific test and maintenance information is obtained from the operating experience. All DGs are tested with no-load once in a week and tested with load once in two months. Scheduled maintenance is carried out once in three months on all the DGs. However, maintenance is not simultaneously carried out for more than one DG. During no-load or full-load test, DGs can take the demand which makes override probability as one and test duration will not come under down time. Schedule maintenance is carried out on all CBs once in a year during the reactor shut-down. Test and maintenance policy for standby components of the system is given in Table 2 . As test and maintenance activities are scheduled in advance, there is no uncertainty in the interval or duration. Nevertheless, corrective maintenance time (repair time) is a random variable as it depends upon the degree of damage happened to the system. 
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Addressing epistemic uncertainty
The parameters of the distributions for TTF/TTR are not exactly known because of scarcity or lack of data. The probability distribution function assumed for each parameter then quantifies the uncertainty that is due to lack of knowledge about the exact value of this parameter. Lognormal distribution is most widely used to represent epistemic uncertainty [1, 10, 26] . For most of the components used in nuclear utility industry, IAEA TECDOC 478 gives median/mean and error factor or 5% and 95% values [26] . The same document is used here to get the 5% and 95% values of the parameters. The lower (5%) and upper (95%) values represent 90% confidence bounds of the parameter under consideration. Confidence bounds for all the components are listed in Table 3 .
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Results and discussion
Randomness in failure and repair times is characterized at the component level using exponential PDF and subjectivity in the parameter (failure rate/repair rate) of exponential PDF is characterized by a lognormal PDF. Aleatory uncertainty is not acknowledged in the previous uncertainty analysis studies of level-1 PSA. The proposed methodology based on two-phase sampling in Section 3 accounts for both types of uncertainty in the analysis.
The sampling is performed in two loops, an outer loop and an inner loop, to which the two different groups of uncertain parameters belong. In the outer loop, parameter values are sampled from the distributions of failure rate and repair rate of all 14 components (see Table 3 ) and passed on to the inner loop. For each iteration in the outer loop, a specified number of iterations are performed in the inner loop. In the inner loop, stochastic simulation is carried out where the random variables time to failure and ARTICLE IN PRESS time to repair are sampled and system status is depicted based on failure logic of the system. After each iteration in the inner loop, average unavailability is calculated from TTF and TTR of the system. The result will be a distribution which is governed solely by the uncertainty in the stochastic parameters. This procedure is repeated as many times as desire, each cycle producing one distribution. The final result will be a collection of distributions where every distribution represents aleatory uncertainty and spread of distributions represents epistemic uncertainty. In-house computer code has been developed to implement the methodology mentioned in Section 3. Number of iterations is kept as the convergence criteria for simulation. Crude sampling approach is adopted in the present problem, however, variance reduction methods such as Latin hypercube sampling or importance sampling also can be used to improve the performance of simulation. In the present problem, the inner loop simulation encompasses 5000 iterations with mission time of 2 Â 10 5 h and outer loop is sampled for 100 iterations. Failure time, down time and average unavailability are important reliability measures for the chosen system. The results obtained for failure time and repair time are shown in Figs. 5 and 6, respectively. The spread in the result of failure time is more than the spread of repair time, which denotes epistemic uncertainty is dominating in the former case. On contrary, repair time seems to have more randomness effect than failure time. However, uncertainty in unavailability is having both the contributions as depicted in Fig. 7 .
Conclusions
In spite of several potential benefits/applications of level-1 PSA for its system effectiveness, the uncertainties associated with parameters, models, phenomena and assumptions are keeping the limitations on its usage. Knowing the sources of uncertainty involved in the analysis plays an important role in handling it. If one knows why there are uncertainties and what kinds of uncertainties are involved, one has a better chance of finding the right methods for reducing them. Problem of acknowledging and treating uncertainty is vital for quality and practical usability of the analysis results. Uncertainty analysis methods quantify uncertainty in the model output arising due to uncertainties in input parameters of the model. Previous uncertainty studies on level-1 PSA did not acknowledge the distinction of different types of uncertainty. The distinction of uncertainties is useful for taking the reliability/risk informed decisions with confidence and also for effective management of uncertainty.
A methodology based on two-phase Monte-Carlo simulation is presented for distinguishing both the kinds of uncertainty in the context of availability/reliability evaluation in level-1 PSA studies of NPP. A case of application on AC power supply system of Indian NPP is also carried out. The methodology gives good framework for the treatment of both stochastic and knowledge based uncertainties in the analysis. 
